We look for a converse to a result from [12] that if the weak pigeonhole principle fails in a model K of bounded arithmetic, then there is an end-extension of K interpretable inside K. We show that if a model J of an induction-free theory of arithmetic is interpretable inside K, then either J is isomorphic to an initial segment of K (J is "smaller" than K), or K is isomorphic to an initial segment of J (J is "bigger" than K) and in this case the the weak pigeonhole principle fails in K. This result is formulated in terms of a theory S 1 0 of bounded arithmetic with a greatest element.
model K of PA, then J is an end-extension of K. In the first half of this paper we formalize a version of the second construction in a theory S 1 0 of bounded arithmetic. We show that if any model J of an algebraic fragment R of S 1 0 is interpretable (in the right way) inside a model K of S 1 0 , then either J is isomorphic to an initial segment of K, or J is isomorphic to an end-extension of K and the weak pigeonhole principle (WPHP) fails in K.
Here S 1 0 is closely related to Buss' theory S 1 2 . The main difference is that S 1 0 is in a relational language (except for constant symbols for 0,1 and 2) and has an axiom that there is a greatest element. It is intended as an axiomatization of the important properties of initial segments of S 1 2 (here, and in general, by initial segment we mean initial segment with a greatest element). We want to be able to talk about our interpreted structures using bounded formulas, so it is natural to consider structures whose domains are bounded sets. As a result interpreted structures with no greatest element will be the pathological case rather than the normal case, which is why we work with theories of arithmetic with a top. Another advantage is that in a model with a top every quantifier is automatically bounded, so we can apply model-theoretic results that hold for general formulas to bounded formulas, although we do not use this in this paper. Lastly it makes our results slightly more general. In particular it gives us an elegant way to analyze how much quantification is needed for an argument, by moving the top element higher or lower and looking at how the properties of the structure change.
Section 2 below contains definitions of these theories, and section 3 gives our construction of an isomorphism and the connection with WPHP. Our original motivation was to find a converse to a theorem in [12] , included as theorem 3.4 below, which states that if WPHP fails (in the right way) in a model K of arithmetic with a top, then there is a large end extension of K interpretable inside K. Corollary 3.10 is almost a converse; but by Friedman's theorem any countable nonstandard model of PA has an isomorphic proper initial segment (here without a top element) so we can find a model of arithmetic with a top with a similar property, and in which WPHP holds. This is an obstacle to the moral which we would be like to be able to draw from the results of this paper, together with [12] and [8] : that the weak pigeonhole principle holds in a model M of arithmetic if and only if large initial segments of M are in some sense "more complicated" than small ones. However despite this I think that the idea of the relative complexity of initial segments, studied here in terms of what sort of "interpreted structures" or "inner models" can live in a segment, is useful and can give some insight into the open problems regarding the provability of WPHP.
At the end of section 3 we present some corollaries: that in a model of S 1 2 in which WPHP holds we can precisely count structured sets (where a structured set is one that comes with relations making it into a model of the weak theory R) and that S In the last section we look at the limits of what we can prove about an interpreted structure using the weak pigeonhole principle. Our tool here is a result of Wilkie that uses Buss' witnessing theorem to show that if a ∀Σ b 1 formula is provable in S 1 2 plus the surjective WPHP for PV formulas, then it can be witnessed in probabilistic polynomial time. We give a new proof of this result using some of the development of this theory in [12] . We use this to show that this theory does not prove that a finite linear ordering is isomorphic to the standard linear ordering (in fact it does not prove that it has a least element) and that it does not prove the injective WPHP. In corollary 4.9 we give a general sufficient condition for unprovability from this theory in the relativized setting, intended as an analogue of Riis' elegant criterion for unprovability from T Theorem 1.1 (Riis [9] ) Let Φ be any sentence containing only symbols from a language α disjoint from the language of arithmetic. If Φ has an infinite model then
The results from this paper are presented in more detail in my doctoral thesis [11] , except for the proof of theorem 4.7. Most of the remaining material in [11] has appeared as [12] .
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Definitions
Our language will consist of the three place relations x = y + z and x = y · z, the two place relations x < y and |x| = y and the constants 0, 1, 2. We use a relational language because + and · do not define total functions and to ensure that initial segments of models of our theory are always substructures. The intended interpretation of the length |x| of x is the number of digits in the binary expansion of x. So for example 2 i has length i + 1 and 2 i − 1 has length i. 4. x + 1 = y ↔ y is the successor of x; x · 1 = x;
6. If (x+y)+z = w then y+z and x+(y+z) are defined and x+(y+z) = w; similarly for ·; 10. x = 0 → (|2 · x| = |x| + 1 ∧ |2 · x + 1| = |x| + 1) and when the left hand side of either of the conjucts is defined, so is the right hand side;
11. If x < y ∧ (z + y is defined ) then (z + x is defined and z + x < z + y); if x < y ∧ 0 < z ∧ (z · y is defined ) then (z · x is defined and z · x < z · y);
12. x y → |x| |y|;
13. x < y ↔ ∃z (0 < z y ∧ x + z = y);
15. ∃y (x = 2 · y ∨ x = 2 · y + 1). To expand on what is meant by [0, e + 1), it is often the case that the most natural expression to describe the form of a strucure does not name any element in the structure. For example we may want to consider models of the form [0, 2 a ) (for some a in the model). For a definition intrinsic to the model, we could think of it as the set of binary strings of length a, or define the top element to be the sum of 2 a−1 and 2 a−1 − 1.
We will define a new class of formulas, theΣ b i formulas. These are very similar to the Σ b i formulas but their syntax is more appropriate for working with models with a top element, since we will bound our quantifiers with variables rather than with terms. In models with a top every quantifier is implicitly bounded by the top element.
We first need a new definition of "sharply bounded": This definition is equivalent to the standard definition of sharply bounded, in the structures that we consider. It does not quite work as it stands, since | | and · are relation rather than function symbols. So for example ∃x |y| 2 φ(x, y) written out fully is
This will not cause any problems, since in models of our theories | | will always define a function and multiplication will generally be a total function when restricted to lengths. We will always allow parameters in formulas defining sets in a structure, unless we say otherwise explicitly. 
for allΣ The theory S 1 0 is strong enough to prove that we can consider numbers as codes for binary sequences and define a relation bit(x, i) = 1. In S i 0 we can prove that any short binary sequence defined by a∆ b i formula is coded by some number. The proofs are standard, we just need to be careful that we do not need to use any numbers larger than our top element -see [11] for details.
We could convert S i 0 into a theory equivalent to S i 2 by replacing the axiom that there is a greatest element with an axiom stating that the smash function is total, ∀x ∀y ∃z |z| = |x|·|y|. Typical models of S The only difference is that we do not need to add axioms limiting the growth rate of any new functions we introduce, since their ranges are automatically bounded by the top element.
We will also make use of the theory PV and of a relativized version of it. Our definitions of these are slightly nonstandard and we give them here: Note that the surjective and injective PHPs are weakenings of multifunction PHP. By theorem 1.1 none of these principles is provable in T 1 2 , in the relativized case. In [7] it is shown that they are all provable in T 
Interpreted structures
For simplicity we present these results for the theory S formulas, although versions of them hold higher in the hierarchy.
We will often write elements of such a J in the form [b] J , meaning the = J equivalence class of some b ∈ S.
For a trivial example of an interpreted structure, if K R and a ∈ K, then the structure K ↾ a isΣ b 1 interpreted in K below a, using the normal relation symbols. Here is a theorem from [12] that sets out some of the consequences of WPHP failing in a structure:
If I is any end-extension of K to a model of S
I is relatively categorical over K with respect to the theory
is the greatest element). That is, I is isomorphic over K to any endextension of K to a model of this theory.
In [12] we used some tools from model theory to give a partial converse to part 2 of this theorem. Here we look for a converse to part 1. We come close with corollary 3.10, but it turns out that a precise converse is impossible as a consequence of Friedman's theorem (see below). As a warm-up for dealing with interpreted structures and definable isomorphisms, we prove a lemma that we will use later. It has the consequence that if an interpreted structure J is definably isomorphic to an initial segment of K, then that initial segment is unique. Proof First notice that σ must be the identity at least up to |a|, since otherwise there would be a least i |a| for which σ(i) = i, which is impossible. Now suppose x < a and σ(x) = y. Then |y| |b| = σ(|a|) = |a|, and for each i < |a|,
since σ is an isomorphism. But σ(i) = i for all such i. Hence x = y.
The proof of our main result (theorem 3.9) is in two steps. Lemma 3.8 shows that if a small initial segment of J is isomorphic to an initial segment of K then we can extend that isomorphism to one with an exponentially larger domain. We use a similar argument to the proof of the previous lemma, using the bit(x, i) = 1 relation to extend a small isomorphism to a large one. Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7 help with this by showing that under this assumption certain initial segments of J have well-behaved structures and define the bit(x, i) = 1 relation correctly.
In theorem 3.9 we show that if J is defined on a domain inside some initial segment [0, a) of K, and if K is big enough to be able to code sequences of elements in J, then we can find an isomorphism on a small initial segment of J to apply lemma 3.8 to. K is "big enough" if it contains a |a| (n) , where | |
means a nesting of | |s that is n levels deep. The element a |a| (n) here plays a similar role in the original proof of the weak pigeonhole principle in [8] .
Our argument is a more powerful version of the way of constructing an isomorphism sketched out in the introduction, where we first used repeated doubling in J to find the elements corresponding to the powers of 2, then extended this to a complete isomorphism using binary expansions. Here we use repeated adding to find the elements of J corresponding to the logarithmically sized elements of K, then prove that this tells us something about binary expansions in J, then use this to extend the isomorphism. set S giving the domain of the interpreted structure). Suppose that for some t ∈ S and some ε < |a| there is aΣ
Proof We claim that for eachΣ
We prove this by induction on the quantifier complexity of φ. From the definition ofΣ b 1 -interpretability we know how to translate open formulas into formulas that are∆ b 1 in S, which is precisely the property required. We can
1 formula and n ∈ N. We extend ourΣ
given by aΣ b 1 formula χ say, and define
To show thatΣ
Proof We need to show that the formulas defining these relations do not use any sharply bounded universal quantifiers, since these would not in general translate into sharply bounded quantifiers in K. Then we can translate existential quantifiers over J as existential quantifiers over S. We use the following definitions:
1. The relation parity(x) = δ is given by
2. The relation 2 i = x is given by
3. The relation decomp(x, i) = (y, z) is given by
4. The relation MSP(x, i) = z (standing for Most Significant Part) is given by ∃y decomp(x, i) = (y, z).
5. The relation bit(x, i) = δ is given by δ = parity(MSP(x, i − 1)).
These can be proved to have the right properties in J because J |= S Proof We extend a small isomorpism to a larger isomorphism in the same way as in lemma 3.5, again taking advantage of the fact that a number is uniquely described by its sequence of bits.
Let t be (a representative of) the < J -greatest element of J. We will inductively constructΣ . So we can choose r so that it is a power of 2 in J, and the equivalence class of r is the element of J corresponding to 2 i in K. Hence 2 i is the greatest power of 2 which exists in both K ↾ |a| (m−1) and J (in some sense).
Define θ(x, y) as
We claim that σ : x → {y : θ(x, y)} is an isomorphism from K ↾ 
We show that σ is injective in a similar way.
To show that σ is defined on all of K ↾ 2 i , let x < 2 i and let χ(j) be the formula
expressing that some [y] J is the correct image of x up to its jth bit and the remaining bits are 0. Then χ(0) holds, and if for any j < i we have that χ(j) holds and is witnessed by y, we can find the element of J corresponding to 2 j and, depending on bit(x, j + 1), let y ′ be either y or (y + Finally, since we can define all our relations bitwise, σ is an isomorphism.
To extend σ to the rest of K ↾ |a| (m−1) , notice that by our choice of i either
if this is non-empty, which it will be until we reach the top element t of J. Proof Let θ(i, w) be the following formula, where we use a number w to code a sequence w 0 , . . . , w i of elements of [0, a) via its base a expansion:
Let i < ε be greatest such that ∃w a i θ(i, w) and let t = w i . We must have i 1, since we can set w 0 = 0 J and w 1 = 1 J . Let φ(x, y) be the formula S(y) ∧ y = J w x . We claim that σ : x → {y : φ(x, y)} is an isomorphism from
It is sufficient to show that σ is surjective. Suppose it is not, and for some s ∈ S we have s < J t and ∀j i ¬φ(j, s). Let j i be greatest such that w j < J s. Then j < i and w j+1 J s.
If i < ε − 1, then t must be the < J greatest element of J (otherwise we could add an extra element to w). Hence we have constructed an isomorphism from an initial segment of K onto all of J.
If i = ε − 1, then we have an isomorphism from K ↾ |b| (n) onto an initial segment of J and can use lemma 3.8.
n ∈ N, and that K is isomorphic to a structure J that isΣ
. Suppose further that K is not isomorphic to any proper initial segment of K. Then there is aΣ
In particular, φ maps equivalence classes of S ⊆ K ↾ a (where S is the set on which J is defined) bijectively onto K. Inverting this mapping we obtain ā Σ b 1 multifunction mapping K injectively into S, hence (multifunction) WPHP fails in K. Furthermore, if S is all of K ↾ a, then we get a surjection a ։ a ε ; if each = J equivalence class has precisely one member, then we get an injection a ε ֒→ a.
We cannot do without the condition "K is not isomorphic to any proper initial segment of K" because otherwise we have the following counterexample: let M be any countable nonstandard model of PA. By Friedman's theorem [4] a (∆ 0 ) [8] .
It would be interesting to see how much of an increase in size is necessary to construct our isomorphism. For example, can we use an exponent smaller than any nesting of logs |a| (n) in corollary 3.11? Would an exponent of 1, and so no extra space for coding at all, be sufficient? It seems as though this should be related to the provability of WPHP in I∆ 0 .
We can interpret theorem 3.9 together with lemma 3.5 as saying that aΣ
set S in a model of S 1 0 is either bigger than the model or has a unique precise size in the model, provided of course that S comes with lots of structure and that we take counting statements to be about the existence of isomorphisms, rather than just bijections. In some ways this is a natural step, similar to moving from cardinal to ordinal numbers by adding an ordering relation.
If we are in a model of S 1 2 , then the smash function guarantees that we have the space to code short sequences of elements of S and construct our isomorphism. If we also know that the weak pigeonhole principle holds, this guarantees that our set S is not "bigger" than the original model. We summarise this as: in a model of S 1 2 satisfying WPHP we can precisely count structured sets. We make this precise below, using the injective WPHP. There are similar results for surjective or multifunction WPHP.
We will say that a Σ b 1 set S is structured if it is bounded and there are relations Theorem 3.9 also holds in the relativized case, although we have to be careful about the classes of formulas for which induction holds in our different structures.
Theorem 3.13 Let α be a set of new relation and function symbols. Suppose
, and a, a ε ∈ K where ε > |b| (n) for some 
Proof The independence from S One conclusion we can draw is that if we are looking for independence results for theories as strong as or stronger than S is provable), then there is a class of principles (of the form α R → Φ(α)) where we gain nothing by considering the relativized case. This is because if we construct a model of S 3 2 (α) in which the structure given by α is a model of R but not of Φ, then Φ must already by false in the unrelativized model (with α removed), since part of this model is isomorphic to the structure α.
It would be interesting to find other weak theories that work in the place of R to give similar results. One possibility would be a universally axiomatized theory of "discretely ordered abelian groups with a greatest element" in the language {0, 1, e, <, +, −, ⌊ x 2 ⌋, parity} (with some sort of modulo addition); another would be a fragment of set theory, where we have set membership in place of the relation bit(x, i) = 1.
The results in the next section concern what cannot be proved about a structure given by oracles, even if we use WPHP, and may be useful for showing that certain theories are too weak to work in place of R.
Witnessing with a probabilistic machine
We look for some relativized independence results from theories of bounded arithmetic that include the pigeonhole principle. The strongest theory we can practically use here is (the relativized form of) S Theorem 4.2 is due to Wilkie and was first published in [6] . We give an alternative proof here, using a technical lemma implicit in [12] : any PV function symbol f (c, x) , there is a PV function symbol G(x) (with no other parameters) such that
Proof Suppose f (c, x) is a surjection a ։ a 2 (x here is a placeholder). Then by corollary 2.2 of [12] we have a PV surjection F (c, b
only the parameters shown. Define G so that
Since c, b − 1 and a are all less than b, the range of
formula, then there is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine which, for any input x, outputs with probability at least 2/3 some y such that N θ(x, y).
Proof Let u(e, w, t) be the universal PV function symbol, calculating the output of the program with code e run for time |t| on input w. Suppose
where w is a placeholder. Moving WPHP to the right hand side and using Parikh's theorem we have that for some k ∈ N, S 1 2 ⊢ ∀x , (∃a, e, t < 2 |x| k ∀v < a 2 ∃w < a u(e, w, t) = v) ∨ ∃y θ(x, y).
By lemma 4.1 there is G ∈ L PV such that if the universal function symbol defines a surjection a ։ a 2 for some a < 2 |x| k using parameters e, t < 2
Hence by Buss' witnessing theorem [3] there are PV functions g 0 and g 1 such that
So given x, if we choose v at random in [0, 2 8|x| k ), with high probability we will have θ(x, g 1 (x, v)) since in the standard model very few of the elements of [0, 2 8|x| k ) will be in the range of G on the domain [0, 2 4|x| k ).
This theorem relativizes with no significant changes to the proof. It follows from this theorem that any set ∆
is in the complexity class RP ∩ coRP. However the converse is unlikely to hold since this would imply that RP∩coRP has a complete language, which is not true in a relativized world [2] . This is shown in some detail in [11] . See also [5] for more connections between this theory and probabilistic complexity.
Definition 4.3 Suppose that α is a tuple of functions, relations and constants on a domain [0, a). We say that a Turing machine M is given a structure K = [0, a), α as input if it starts with the number a written on its input tape and is given access to an oracle for the relations and functions in α, where we treat constants as constant valued functions.
What can a probabilistic machine tell in polynomial time about a structure it is given as input? This sort of question has been studied in cryptography, where the functions are usually algebraic and the structures are called "black box" groups or fields [10, 1] ; and in the design of sublinear algorithms, where a machine does not have the time to look at all of its input but only a random sample (some particular applications of theorem 4.7 are folklore in this field). We give a (weak) general result. Intuitively, it seems likely that all such a machine can do is choose a tuple of elements of the structure at random, then work on those by applying relations and functions from the structure to them. We prove that this is indeed the case. a ∈ N, and K = [0, a),r,f,c is a structure with  a finite number of relations, functions and constantsr,f, We consider a probabilistic machine running for time t on a structure K, with the goal of outputting a tuple in K from some given set W of distinguished tuples. We show that the machine can do no better than choose t elements x 1 , . . . , x t at random and apply a straight-line program of length t. In practice the machine would use queries about relations to decide which program to apply tox; our result here is rather weak because we effectively assume that the machine always automatically knows the best possible program (which is why relations do not play a rôle in the above definition).
Definition 4.4 Suppose
Our strategy is to produce a large set of structures as permutations of some given structure; if there is a probabilistic machine that succeeds with high probability for all these permutations, there must be a deterministic machine (essentially a branching program) that succeeds with high probability on a random permutation from our set. We use this to show that if we run our deterministic machine and make sure that the only elements of the structure that it has access to are either chosen at random or by applying functions fromf, then it still succeeds with high probability, and this gives us our result. 
Suppose that if we choose t elements from [0, a) at random (with replacements) then with probability at least q no tuple in W can be derived from these elements by any straight-line program in K of length t. Then there is no probabilistic machine M such that for all σ ∈ S, M runs on K σ for time t and ouputs a tuple in W σ with probability at least 1 − q + t 2 /a.
Proof Suppose such a machine M does exist. By Yao's minimax principle, if for every permutation σ ∈ S a the machine succeeds for a fraction 1−q+t 2 /a of its possible sequences of coin tosses, then there must be some sequence c of coin tosses with which the machine succeeds for at least (1 − q + t 2 /a)|S a | of the possible permutations σ. Let M c be the branching program which simulates M with coin tosses c.
We will obtain a contradiction by constructing a large number of σs for which M c fails.
The only part of M c we consider is a combined oracle query and oracle reply tape, which at the end of step i of the computation will contain an element w i of [0, a). We allow M c to do one of three things at each step i + 1:
3. Query [f k (w i−l+1 , . . . , w i ) =?] and expect w i+1 to be the correct answer, where f k is a function symbol of arity l. We treat constants in the language of K as constant valued functions.
We assume that everything output by the machine appears at some point on the query tape. Note that in order to treat uniformly all the information passed to and from the oracle, the oracle replies to queries about relations with a number 0/1 rather than with an answer "yes/no", and that this reply is treated the same as any other number appearing on the tape. For our proof to work with this simplifying assumption we also assume that the first two actions of the machine are to put w 1 = 0 and w 2 = 1, which we can do without loss of generality. We present our strategy for constructing σ as a probabilistic argument. The first step is to choose numbers u 1 , . . . , u t uniformly at random in [0, a), with repetitions allowed. We will show that with high probability u 1 , . . . , u t can be used to construct a partial permutation σ * of size t. Then we will extend this at random to a total permutation on which, with high probability, M c will fail. To construct σ * , first set σ 0 = ∅ and begin a computation of M c . As we go along we will define an increasing sequence σ i of partial permutations and we will use up the numbers u 1 , . . . , u t . Suppose that at the end of step i in the computation σ i is a partial permutation of [0, a), defined on w 1 , . . . , w i (this list may contain repetitions) and nowhere else. The definition of σ i+1 depends on the next action M c takes.
1. If M c writes down an element w i+1 , let σ i+1 = σ i if w i+1 has already occurred on the list. If w i+1 is new, let y be the first element of u 1 , . . . , u t that we have not yet used, and let σ i+1 = σ i ∪ { w i+1 , y }. If σ i+1 is no longer a partial permutation, abandon the construction.
] is queried set w i+1 to be 0 or 1, depending on the truth of r k (σ i (w i−l+1 ), . . . , σ i (w i )). Let σ i+1 = σ i .
sequences of random choices we could have made to construct σ. Suppose X and Y are two distinct such sequences, which both allow us to construct permutations, respectively σ and τ . Then σ = τ , which can be seen by considering the pairs added in the constructions of σ and τ at the first step at which X and Y differ. Hence we have constructed at least (q − t 2 /a)a Proof Suppose
is provable in the theory. If we introduce a Herbrand function p to replace the universal quantifier ∀y , we have that ∀a , (< * is a total order on [0, a))
is provable in the theory. This is a Σ b 1 (< * , p) formula, so by theorem 4.2 there is a probabilistic polynomial time machine M which will, when equipped with oracles for < * and p and given an input a, find witnesses with high probability. Now choose a so that it is much bigger than the running time t = |a| k of the machine. Let K = [0, a), <, P where P is the predecessor function. Then for any permutation σ, the relation < σ is a total ordering so our machine run on K σ should output 0 σ as the the only possible witness to the sentence above. However ifv is any tuple of size ≤ t in K, 0 is derivable fromv by a straight-line program in K of length t only ifv contains an element in the range 0, . . . , t − 1, because the most a straight-line program of length t can do is apply P t-many times. Ifv is chosen at random this happens with probability
So by theorem 4.7 our probabilistic machine on input K σ , taking W as the set {0 σ }, cannot output a witness with high probability, a contradiction.
In more generality we have that if there is a large structure α in which a witness to a sentence ∃x θ(x) is hard to find, then S 1 2 (α) + ∀x PHP x x 2 (PV(α)) does not prove that such a witness always exists in a finite structure. Here "hard to find" means "hard to find by choosing some elements at random and then applying functions from the structure to them". Notice this also allows us to prove independence of sentences of the form ∀ȳ ∃x θ(x,ȳ), by treating the parametersȳ as constants in our structure. Formally, It would be interesting to match this more closely to theorem 1.1, by finding a more elegant condition or by strengthening the induction allowed from S 1 2 (α) to S 2 2 (α). Notice that this result does not apply to the kinds of structures dealt with in section 3. Firstly we would have to introduce some skolem function symbols to make R into a universal theory, which we would need to do to work with it in the framework of PV functions. We would then end up with a constant symbol for 0, a function symbol for successor and a function symbol for doubling (or something equivalent to these), and these allow us to reach any element of the structure in logarithmically many steps.
In some cases we have easy ways of constructing a large number of models of a theory, so do not have to resort to the trick above of only considering isomorphic copies of a single structure. This can give apparently stronger results: Proof Suppose the theorem fails. Then there is a probabilistic machine that, given a structure [0, a), f as input, where f is a binary function symbol, outputs with high probability distinct pairs (x 1 , x 2 ) and (y 1 , y 2 ) such that f (x 1 , x 2 ) = f (y 1 , y 2 ).
We use the same idea as in theorem 4.7, but rather than construct our counterexample structures as permutations of a given structure we simply choose a sufficiently large and consider the set of all possible binary functions on [0, a). By Yao's principle again, if our machine M succeeds with high probability on every such function, there must be a sequence of coin tosses c which succeeds with high probability if we choose a function at random.
Let f be a binary function chosen at random, and let t be the running time of the machine. As it runs the machine can make at most t oracle queries [f (z 1 , z 2 ) =?]. The probability that the machine finds two pairs that f maps to the same number is the probability that t elements chosen independently at random from [0, a) contain a repetition, which is bounded by 1 − (1 − t/a) t < t 2 /a.
So if we choose a sufficiently large, with high probability M c fails on a randomly chosen function. Hence there can be no such machine M. Proof Apply a relativized version of lemma 4.11.
